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An innovative movement in the state of Rajasthan
has substantially altered India's public discourse
on how best to combat forms of corruption which
particularly afflict the poor. Spearheaded by the
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), or
Workers and Farmers Power Organisation, this
movement demands and frequently obtains access
to official expenditure records which citizen-
activists then cross-check in a kind of people
audit. The MKSS collective process has exposed
fraud in several local governments, deterred fur-
ther malfeasance in others, influenced legal
debates, and generated a wider campaign for leg-
islative and regulatory change at the state and
national level.
Several organisations within lndia vast and varied
civil society share either the MKSS concern for
empowering the poor by halting the theft of public
resources intended for them, or its enthusiasm for
actively challenging the culture of bureaucratic
secrecy - but not both. Many environmental
activists, for instance, demand access to govern-
ment information; their primary aim, however, is
not checking misuse of public funds intended for
the poor. Other groups share the MKSS's preoccu-
pation with combating corruption, but without
emphasising the type of popular auditing which
only access to official records makes possible. In
short, no other group has brought together the oth-
erwise over-used and under-specified ideas of
transparency and accountability in such a creative,
consistent, and collective fashion. This article sug-
gests reasons why it is particularly difficult for civil
society to organise effectively to curb forms of cor-
ruption that disproportionately harm the poor. In
the process, we engage with ongoing debates in the
international literature on civil society's contribu-
tion to accountable governance.
In particular, we take issue with currently fashion-
able views on the state's ability to 'foster' the emer-
gence of forms of civil society that effectively
articulate the interests of poor and marginalised
people. The Indian case material highlights the
unpredictability of statecivil society interactions at
the best of times, and the outright undesirability of
many associational forms which have been fostered
through state action. The argument is not that
We have addressed this issue at greater length in
Jenkins and Goetz (1999b).
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state-fostered forms of civil society are always dys-
functional, just that they often are. Moreover, even
those that do produce desirable outcomes fail to
challenge the state in one critically important area:
auditing the financial performance of government
itself.
This is a particularly suitable theme for a volume
celebrating Gordon's White's contribution to devel-
opment studies. Gordon's intellectual inclinations,
particularly his scepticism about 'the current ideali-
sation of the democratic character of civil society',
indicate a thinker far more alert than most students
of democracy to the potential for civil society to
evolve in ways that defy conventional understand-
ings, and sometimes even to serve undemocratic
ends.2 Much of his work on China, for instance,
illustrated with complex empirical evidence the
ambiguous character of civil society, and above all
the unpredictability of associational entities created
through state action (White el al. 1996).
This is by nature a perverse paper: it uses the case
of a highly effective anti-corruption movement - a
success story if ever there was one - to illustrate
why it is so difficult for those portions of civil soci-
ety concerned with promoting the interests of
poorer groups to combat corruption. But the more
one learns about the MKSS - and the more one
examines other anti-corruption movements which
at first glance seem to parallel the MKSS approach,
but turn out to lack crucial ingredients - the more
exceptional this grassroots movement seems.
What is needed, then, is an explanation for the
overwhelming tendency of nascent anti-corrup-
tion movements to fail in their efforts to recruit
allies among civil-society organisations oriented
towards mobilising the poor. This requires an
introductïon to what makes the MKSS such an
unusual phenomenon, bearing in mind that it is
the contrast between this ideal type and the many
other less-effective organisations that is the analyt-
ical starting point.
2 This phrase is drawn from the second instalment in
Gordon's two-part article on civil society and democratic
development, a sceptical commentary on the optimistic
and under-examined assumptions regarding the
democratising role of civil society See White (1994 and
1995).
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1 Contextualising the MKSS3
The MKSS is a grassroots organisation of mainly
poor people based in Rajasthanb economically
underdeveloped Rajsamand district. lt has
described itself as a 'non-party political formation'
lt relies for support less on its relatively small for-
mal membership than on its much larger informal
following. The driving force behind the MKSS is a
combination of local people from socially excluded
groups and a handful of committed activists from
other parts of India who, since the late 1980s, have
made the area their home. The MKSS distinguishes
itself from conventional non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs): instead of channelling external
funds or focusing on service delivery, it addresses
issues of concern to the poorer sections of local
society through mass action and strategic con-
frontation with the state administration.
The MKSSb interest in the right to information
arose from its work in the late 1980s and early
1990s on livelihood issues, particularly the failure
of the state government to enforce minimum-wage
regulations on employment-generation pro-
grammes in drought-prone areas. This generated a
belief that access to official documents was an
essential part of the struggle to demand account-
ability from local authorities. The MKSS campaign
to secure minimum wages for employees on
drought-relief works highlighted the role of corrup-
tion in the underpayment of wages, as it became
clear that local authorities were billing the central
and state governments for amounts that far
exceeded what workers were paid. This could only
be confirmed by examining the financial documents
pertaining to specific schemes, and checking these
against the experience of workers. Other malprac-
tices included inflated estimates for public-works
projects, the use of poor-quality materials, and over-
billing by suppliers. To combat these forms of
fraud, access was required not only to balance
sheets, but also to supporting documentation which
could be cross-checked by workers organised
Space constraints limit the background which can he
provided. For fuller accounts, see Mander and Joshi
(1999), MKSS (1996), and Dogra and Dogra (1996).
In using this descriptor, the MKSS follows a stream of
thinking on the role of voluntary organisations in Indian
politics, which can be traced to the theorising of Rajni
Kothari, who coined the term in the mid-1980s. For a
later elaboration of this concept, see Kothari (1990).
through the MKSS - for instance, employment regis-
ters and bills submitted for the purchase of materials.
The MKSS gets this documentation by appealing to
the virtue of sympathetic bureaucrats, or through
public protest action aimed at those with less active
consciences. Its key innovation is the collective
analysis of official information. In locally organised
jan sunwais - or 'public hearings' - expenditure
statements derived from official records are read
aloud to assembled villagers. These orderly hearings
are presided over by a panel of respected individu-
als from within and outside the area. Local people
are invited to give testimony which identifies dis-
crepancies between the official record and their
own experiences as labourers on public-works pro-
jects or applicants for means-tested anti-poverty
schemes. Through this direct form of 'social audit'
many people discovered that they had been listed as
beneficiaries of anti-poverty schemes, though they
had never received payment. Others were aston-
ished to learn of large payments to local building
contractors for works that were never performed.
This approach depends upon a principle of collec-
tive and very local verification of official accounts,
as it is only at the local level that the many small
diversions of funds, which go unnoticed in massive
formal audits, can be detected.
Although successful in exposing corruption in a
number of localities, jan sunwais have been rela-
tively rare because of the difficulty in obtaining cer-
tified copies of government accounts from reluctant
officials. In response, the MKSS developed a paral-
lel strategy involving large-scale public protests.
The objective: legislative and regulatory reforms to
provide a legal basis for local efforts to obtain offi-
cial records. The main demand is that citizens be
entitled to photocopy government documents,
except those with national-security implications.
The state government has vacillated in response to
this demand for the past four years. In early 1999
the states new chief minister appointed an official
committee to develop a non-statutory system for
improving access to information. It has already
insisted that secrecy will remain the norm: only
specifically indicated items will be available, and
even then not in undigested form.
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2 The Limits of Civil Society
Robert Klitgaard has set forth several factors which
account for civil society poor track record at
organising to fight corruption:
It is difficult to form a political constituency for
an anticorruption effort. Unlike lobbies for, say,
soya production or education, no well-orga-
nized citizens' group has a clear stake in fight-
ing corruption. Moreover, civil servants often
find anticorruption campaigns threatening.
Honest officials may fear being tarred with a
reckless accusation; dishonest ones will raise
obstacles against efforts to expose and punish
their illicit activities. It is possible to launch an
anticorruption campaign during a wave of pub-
lic resentment, but institutionalizing public
concern is difficult (Klitgaard 1991:97).
Transparency International (TI), a leading interna-
tional NGO, highlights similar constraints. Arguing
that 'Iclivil society is, typically, the major victim' of
corruption, and thus should have a strong motive to
dismantle the system, TI nevertheless admits that:
Civil society's response to the problem has, in
the past, been fragmented. Lawyers may be
policed by laws and bar associations or accoun-
tants by their professional bodies, but few
within civil society have taken the broader
view: to contemplate what the integral parts of
their society integrity system can and should
look like, and to press for relevant reform
against a holistic blueprint (Transparency
International 1998).
The solution TI offers - a process of building as
broad a constituency for reform as possible - specif-
ically prohibits 'confrontational' activity5 This is
misguided. Civil society failure to curb corruption
is due largely to the unwillingness of key actors to
engage in confrontation.
The evidence from India confirms the conclusion of
Klitgaard and others that at the level of the individual
citizen there is a strong incentive actually to
strengthen the system of corruption by paying bribes,
whether out of necessity or to avoid inconvenience.
lt is this prohibition which perhaps explains the either the role of civil society in general, or the MKSS in
failure of TI's 1998 case study on India to mention particular. See Martin and Feldman (1998:72-87).
At the collective level, a fledgling anticorruption
organisation faces an almost insurmountable hurdle:
sustaining a movement which simultaneously
demands enormous attention to substantive detail
(involving very complex cases of fraud, operating at
multiple levels of political and administrative sys-
tems) and frequent and intensive confrontation with
authorities. These problems are all the more signifi-
cant when considering the capacity of groups of poor
or socially excluded people to fight corruption. This
is why the MKSS demands for information and suc-
cess in using it collectively are so impressive, but also
why they are so rare.
These incentive problems are important, as are all of
the other permutations of the collective-action
dilemma facing would-be anti-corruption activists.
But the constraint we wish to highlight in this paper
comes not from the state, but from civil society itself.
There are several seemingly natural civil-society
allies for any movement to tackle forms of corrup-
tion which particularly afflict the por, and yet they
fail consistently to provide the kind of support
required. What MKSS experience seems to indi-
cate is that anti-corruption campaigns require both
broad-based participation in protest action and
grassroots initiatives to involve ordinary people in
auditing public expenditure at the local level. The
latter in particular is missing. This is because many
organs in civil society who would be expected to
contribute substantially to pro-poor anti-corruption
movements are themselves 'compromised'; they are
implicated in the system which perpetuates corrup-
tion. For present purposes, there are three worth
considering.
The first is perhaps the most well-known: traditional
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of
which engage in dubious business practices. In
India, as elsewhere, many are outright crooked,
siphoning funds to those who control them. Others
are more complicated: their lack of institutional
capacity means that they are unable to monitor
intermediaries who deliver funds and services, lead-
ing to resources being pilfered further down the line.
Another segment of the NGO community consists of
organisations which are both clean and efficient, but
nevertheless dependent on the government's good
will to operate with any degree of effectiveness. They
Interviews, 16 and 17 March 1999, Udaipur.
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are vulnerable to intimidation, especially if they
receive foreign funding.
Surveying Indias NGO community for potential
replicators of the collective-verification approach
pioneered in Rajasthan's jan sunwais, one finds few
signs of hope. Senior representatives from two large
foreign-funded NGOs in southern Rajasthan told us
that they had no intention of pursuing the same
methods as the MKSS, though they were willing to
admit the impact which both the right-to-informa-
tion demand and the jan sunwai approach had
achieved.6 They voiced elaborate justifications for
why the MKSS method was not suited to their way of
working, or why the MKSS, because it focused on
government-administered employment-generation
schemes, was accepting uncritically the state-directed
'development paradigm' - thus neatly attempting to
out-flank the MKSS on the left ideologically The fear
of backlash from the state appeared a more convinc-
ing explanation of the unwillingness of these NGOs
to champion participatory auditing, despite their
involvement in projects ostensibly designed to make
local government more responsive to the poor. The
state could, if it wanted to, detect any number of real
procedural or ethical lapses on the part of NGO staff,
and is more than capable of inventing others to get its
intimidatory message across.
The second seemingly natural civil-society contrib-
utors to a transparency-based anti-corruption
movement are trade unions - often the only force in
a political system with the organisational muscle
required to mount a sustained campaign to promote
the interests of non-elite groups. Though sometimes
derided as a 'labour aristocracy', unions in the
organised sector have a direct interest in combating
forms of corruption that undermine hard-won
worker rights - for instance, ensuring that illicit
income does not undermine the integrity of occu-
pational-health inspectors. Acting as a watchdog
over government's performance of its regulatory
duties, for which access to information is critical, is
a democratic virtue often claimed for the trade-
union sector of civil society
What is preventing organised labour from playing
this role in India? Among other things, corruption.
While in theory the ability of workers to switch
union affiliation or vote out their representatives
should reduce union leaders' scope for obtaining
corrupt income, in practice the grip of mafia-linked
syndicates on union organisations is often strong
enough to prevent the emergence of serious alter-
natives. The case of the textile workers' union in
Mumbai (formerly named Bombay) illustrates how
corrupt civil society organisations can pose a con-
siderable obstacle to the emergence of movements
to make the state accountable to the poor. The
legally recognised union, the Rashtriya Mill
Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), is under the direct control
of criminal gangs operating under the patronage of
senior politicians. The RMMS has systematically
undermined the efforts of a dissident mill-workers'
union, the Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS),
to combat corruption. The GKSS has charged com-
pany managements with failing to live up to their
commitments under government-sanctioned mill-
modernisation plans. Their further charge is that
government regulators have turned a blind eye in
exchange for a share of the spoils.
The central government's statutorily created Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction
approves plans put forward by chronically loss-
making companies, and many of these have been in
the textile sector. The revival packages include per-
mission for mills to sell portions of their century-
old real estate holdings in central Mumbai in order
to raise funds for industrial modernisation. The offi-
cially recognised RMMS is permitted to learn all of
the details of the approved plans, as are the regula-
tory bodies within the state and municipal govern-
ments. However, the RMMS has failed even to look
interested in performing its watchdog function. In
the absence of information detailing the exact con-
cessions granted to the companies and their corre-
sponding commitments under the revival plans -
for instance, the amounts of land to be sold, the
proportion of the proceeds earmarked for job-sav-
ing modernisation, the timeframe and sanctions
stipulated in the agreement - it is impossible for the
GKSS effectively to challenge the managements
(and the government agencies charged with regulat-
ing them) for their failure to fulfil their responsibil-
ities. The unquestionably corrupt and violent
RMMS leadership holds a monopoly over that infor-
mation - or rather holds civil society stake in the
tripartite information oligopoly that also includes
the state and the private-sector mill owners. The
RMMS is quite clearly a civil-society organ impeding
43
efforts among other actors in civil society to use
transparency to combat corruption.
The third seemingly natural civil-society allies of an
anti-corruption movement are associations which
poorer people have been able to build on the basis
of claims made against the state - for instance, rad-
ical groups of forest dwellers, who have none of the
mainstream anxieties of NGOs or trade unions.
Leadership figures, such as resource-rights activists,
are no more susceptible to elite backlash because of
their activism than they already are, due to their
social and economic marginalisation.
Ordinary members of these organisations are, how-
ever, beset by a problem with potentially serious
implications for their ability to take up active roles in
campaigns demanding greater transparency, or to
pursue variants of the jan sunwai method. Like trade
unions and N GOs, they are implicated in corruption,
though in a very different sense. The case of people
living on designated forest land helps to illustrate this
point. Many have had their traditional sources of
livelihood drastically undermined by government
forest policy A good many occupants of government
forest land are illegal encroachers who are able to
remain in place by paying off forest and other land-
revenue officials. While this sort of coerced bribery is
not the moral equivalent of the kickbacks pocketed
by trade-union leaders, it nevertheless leaves the par-
ticipants vulnerable. Rather than forming an extra
battalion in the anti-corruption army, the people who
make up organisations of this type can be dispropor-
tionately unwilling to risk exposure of what is, after
all, illegal behaviour. Many fear, not unreasonably
that they (not the powerful landowners doing the
same thing on a larger scale) will be the targets of a
biased crackdown. They do not possess legal title to
their land, and could be shoved off quickly At the
very least they are susceptible to scare stories of this
type from local elites who might try to discourage
them from contributing to right-to-information
activism, whether at the state or local level.
3 Implications for Theories of
'State-Fostered' Civil Society
One thing all three of these seemingly natural,
though ultimately unhelpful, allies in the struggle
against corruption have in common is a credible
claim to have been brought into being largely
through interaction with the state. The NGOs are
the most clear-cut case: they receive state funds in
many cases, and carry out what were convention-
ally state tasks. As for labour organisations, indus-
trial relations legislation in many sectors (including
textiles) recognises specific unions, which are then
granted far-reaching exclusionary powers over their
competitors. Finally, the peopl&s organisations:
many of these are largely the creation of misguided
state interventions - for instance, associations of
people displaced by large hydro-electric dam pro-
jects. They exist politically to demand compensa-
tion from the state for particular actions, and to
insist upon a radical overhaul of state policy
That all three of these sectors of civil society are prod-
ucts of state action acquires analytical significance in
the light of recent theoretical tendencies in the study
of civil society contribution to accountable gover-
nance. Stemming from a sense that the pendulum had
swung too far in the direction of dichotomising state
and civil society, conceiving of them as natural antag-
onists operating in zero-sum terms, several recent
studies have emphasised the state's role in catalysing
the emergence of specific civil-society organisations,
or promoting conditions under which a 'thickening'
of civil society can take place. Unfortunately, while
seeking to rectify a conceptual imbalance, the new
theoretical wave has taken an unnecessarily benign
view of the state's part in this dialectic. Cases of civil-
society activism have been grouped together to sup-
port the proposition that state action can both
generate the creation of new organisations and
unleash the energies of incipient associations.
Rebecca Aberss (1998) study of a participatory
budgeting process in Porto Alegre, Brazil, is perhaps
the best example of this theoretical tendency Abers
argues that the conventional wisdom has got the
relationship between civil society and democracy all
wrong. The accepted position has long been that
states tend to crowd out civil society - that is, that
social networks are most likely to solidify into
agents for change when the state is in retreat. But
Abers argues persuasively that the participatory
municipal budgeting process in Porto Alegre was a
particularly striking case of what she calls 'state-fog-
tered civic organising'.
In Porto Alegre, neighbourhood associations and
other defined interests have an almost continuous
influence over the process of setting agendas, estab-
lishing spending priorities, scrutinising budget line
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items, and so on. The views of these associations
enter the municipal budgeting process through
their participation in a range of state-created debat-
ing and decision-making bodies. Abervi empirical
evidence supports her basic theoretical claim: that a
government programme can result in 'a successful
state-sponsored effort at capacitating civic groups'.
She thus contests the view that the state is 'highly
unlikely actually to encourage autonomous civic
groups to form' (Abers 1998:514).
Abervi work is part of a longer-term effort, dating to
the mid-1980s, to recast debates on the origins and
growth trajectories of civil societies by 'bringing the
state back in' to our understanding of how polities
evolve (Rueschemeyer et al. 1985). Peter Evans
(1996) subsequently elaborated this concept to
include the mutually constructive roles that states and
mobilised communities can play in supporting each
others' developmental activities through 'statesociety
synergies' (Evans 1996:1119). Much of the evidence
for this synergy is coming from Latin America.
Empirical evidence from India broadly affirms the
argument that states can indeed foster new forms of
civil society There is, however, one extremely
important modification suggested by the Indian
experience: while states can help to foster the diver-
sification of associational life, the result is not
always along predictable or even desirable lines.
This is ignored by almost all of the work which sup-
ports the 'state-fostered civil society' perspective. It
raises, further, two kinds of suspicions: first, that by
focusing on isolated instances in which there were
fortuitous outcomes, the literature gives short shrift
to those cases of state-fostered civil society that did
not produce the desired results; and second, that
even successes like the Porto Alegre experiment,
because of their parentage at the hands of the state,
might be congenitally incapable of confronting the
most self-preserving instincts of the state by
demanding that details of financial outflows be sub-
jected to public scrutiny
Indeed, there is no mention in the literature on par-
ticipatory budgeting of complementary procedures
for a participatory approach to auditing expendi-
ture. There is no systematic mechanism for opening
up all the supporting documentation which makes
an accounting statement meaningful and makes it
possible for ordinary people to carry out the time-
consuming task of verifying and falsifying the state's
account' of development - by inspecting physical
premises and interviewing ordinary people to
obtain their testimony Whether in Brazil7 or
Uruguay (Chavez 1999), the civil-society actors
spawned by the structure of state programmes and
processes have not gone beyond vague references to
transparency and 'open government'. In Bolivia,
where the Law of Popular Participation' has taken
the concept of collective engagement furthest, there
is evidence that some of the local associations
involved in the budgeting process have themselves
become implicated in patronage politics, and in
some cases outright corruption (Blackburn
1999:12). Moreover, in the case studies on which
Evans constructs his vision of statesociety syner-
gies, which centre on cooperation in the delivery of
services, it is striking that there is no discussion of
states facilitating the critical auditing function civil-
society groups need to play if they are to hold the
state accountable to their poorer citizens.
4 Unintended Consequences
The emphasis thus far has been on the extent to
which state-fostered forms of civil society either
become corrupt - and thus unhelpful in fighting
corruption - or appear disinclined to develop in the
radical directions that would support the more opti-
mistic claims of those who study them. This is not
the same thing as saying that the state's role in shap-
ing and indeed inducing the emergence of particular
expressions of civil society will always produce neg-
ative results. Rather, it highlights the substantial
likelihood that outcomes will deviate from original
expectations - something which aid and develop-
ment organisations fail to recognise at their peril.
The other side to this story of unintended conse-
quences is that other instances of state-fostered civil
society - in fact, those originally viewed with suspi-
cion - can end up generating capacities to make the
state accountable to poor and vulnerable people. We
illustrate this point with two examples from India's
fragmented efforts to promote transparency
The first illustrates how miscalculation on the part
of governing elites can throw open unexpected
spaces for civil society At the beginning of 1998,
the Goa state government passed a landmark right-
to-information law. The intent of the original bill
In addition to Abervi piece, see Santos (1998).
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had little to do with increasing either access to or
dissemination of information which might make
government more accountable. Instead, the bill
included provisions which appeared to discourage
press freedoms. Fears that an attempt was being
made to muzzle the media triggered a protest cam-
paign organised by the Goa Union of Journalists -
until then, a fairly moribund organisatïon. This
mobilised a tremendous cross-section of civil-soci-
ety groups working on issues such as environment
protection, sustainable tourism, and gender equal-
ity Ultimately, the government bowed to pressure
and removed the law anti-press provisions.
The irony is that in an attempt to control the press
the state government provided Goa with India's
only reasonably solid right-to-information legisla-
tion. By grossly miscalculating the level of opposi-
tion the bill would generate, the state created an
opportunity for a diverse array of civil-society
groups to coalesce over a procedural matter and a
liberal right which affects them all. These groups
have continued to work together to pressure the
state government to implement the law provisions
for citizen access to information, and have
embarked on a campaign to motivate even more
organisations in civil society to make use of the act.
The second example of unintended consequences
of state-fostered civil society concerns another phe-
nomenon neglected in the theoretical literature: the
tendency for distinct sectors' in civil society to
redefine themselves and assume new roles in
response to state action. An examination of the
civil-society actors that have used the transparency
provisions grudgingly put in place by India's state
governments in recent years reveals a curious phe-
nomenon: the great interest shown by associations
based on ascriptive identity Such groups, it is
important to note, are often portrayed as the ene-
mies of norm-based governance: by pressing for
benefits for specific communities they are seen to
promote patronage, populism, and in some cases
sectarian conflict. No development agency would
encourage an aid-recipient state to 'foster' them
deliberately
And yet in India they are performing the important
function of demonstrating to other less-well-organised
associations the potential relevance of government
transparency to poorer people. In Goa, for instance,
the Gomantak Bahujan Samiti (GBS), a federation of
'backward caste' associations,8 has used the state new
right-to-information legislation to expose the politi-
cally motivated process by which 'backward' status
was granted to a large and, according to the GBS,
socially and economically privileged caste. The GBS
filed a petition under the Goa Right to Information Act
(GRIA) requesting access to the administrative files
pertaining to that decision. One of the cabinet notes
prepared by the Social Welfare Ministry indicated that
the decision of whether to award 'backward-caste' sta-
tus to this group was referred not to the legally sanc-
tioned Goa State Commission for Backward Classes,
but to the legislature caucus of the ruling Congress
Party The decision, not coincidentally, was made dur-
ing an election campaign, and the caste group in ques-
tion was considered a potentially important electoral
constituency for the ruling party Following the GBS's
presentation of its documentary evidence, the High
Court halted the implementation of the government's
decision to confer 'backward-caste' status on this
group. The GBS subsequently used the GRIA to
research compliance with affirmative-action laws by
obtaining information from all government bodies
about their staff composition. These experiences have
placed the GBS at the forefront of civil society's
attempts to promote use of the law and to pressure the
bureaucracy to implement it.°
Another instance of ascriptive associations perform-
ing the functions one might have expected from
other more 'functionally defined' groups in civil
society comes from the southern state of Kerala. By
setting aside 40% of plan funds for Kera1as elected
village councils - and enacting institutional reforms
to support this process - the state's Left Democratic
Front coalition government, since taking office in
1996, has gone a long way towards involving peo-
pie in the process of setting their own developmen-
tal priorities. In addition, right-to-information
provisions have been added to Kerala local-gov-
ernment legislation. One of the few civil society
organisations to make use of them sought to trace
8 Indian law provides job quotas (or 'reservations') in
public-sector employment for members of 'scheduled
castes' (formerly known as 'untouchables'; currently
termed 'dalits'), 'scheduled tribes', and 'other backward
castes'. The latter are groups which are considered to
have suffered nearly as much historical discrimination
as the two former groups.
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whether funds intended for socially excluded
groups actually reach their targets. The Kerala
Pulayam Maha Sabha (KPMS) has pressed a number
of village councils to reveal how they spent funds
ostensibly earmarked for 'dalits', the most
oppressed members of the Hindu social hierarchy
State law stipulates that 11 per cent of village-level
plan funds be devoted to activities to benefit 'dalits'.
And on paper they are. The reality can be very dif-
ferent. For instance, village councils often count the
entire cost of constructing a road against the 'special
component' (i.e., 'dalit') budget head because one
or two 'dalit' families happen to reside alongside it.
To reveal these misleading accounting practices
requires access to and analysis of actual expenditure
documents. The KPMS has thus far been unable to
obtain these, despite staging sit-ins in front of vil-
lage- and district-council offices.
There are numerous other examples of identity-
based associations stepping in to fill the gap where
other, more 'modern' organisations have failed to
establish a practical link between transparency and
accountability Organisations of tribal people in the
state of Andhra Pradesh, for instance, have forced
the government of chief minister Chandrababu
Naidu to make good its commitment to responsive
government: they have obtained access to land
records dating back decades as part of a process for
adjudicating claims to land expropriated over the
years by both state and private entities.
Apart from being based on appeals to ascriptive
identity, the other thing these groups have in com-
mon is a credible claim to having been state-fos-
tered. The electoral system in India reserves a
proportion of seats in elected bodies for India's
'dalit' and tribal communities. Government jobs
and places in educational institutions are also
awarded on a quota system which gives priority (in
theory) to 'dalits', tribals and members of 'other
backward castes'. These legal provisions have given
rise to associational entities that would otherwise
not likely have emerged in anything resembling the
form they have now.
The GBS experience elicited great interest among
activists at a meeting on implementing Goa's Right to
Information Act, held in the state capital of Panaji on 14
April 1999.
Thus, civil society elements whose emergence is fos-
tered by the state can end up serving purposes very
different to those originally intended by either side.°
In the light of Gordon's theoretical work on civil soci-
ety, it is worth briefly mentioning one other conclu-
sion that can be drawn from this case: that civil
society 'ascriptive-identity' facet has more in com-
mon with the 'functional-interest' facet than is often
acknowledged. Gordon pointed out that the litera-
ture on civil society's role in expanding civil liberties
excludes 'ethnic associations seeking sectional advan-
tage' as much as it does 'business groups bent on
buying political influence' - both of which are seen
to promote undemocratic 'forms of public behaviour
and political accountability'. But, as Gordon consis-
tently maintained, the 'argument that only certain
types of civil society can perform this [democratis-
ing) role, namely those that emerge from a process of
modernisation', greatly limits our understanding of
the complexity of civil society and the potential con-
tribution of civic associations excluded from this nar-
row definition (White 1994:383)11
5 Missing Public Auditing's
Transformative Potential
Despite these welcome, if unintended, contributions,
the relative paucity of civil society organisations
capable of promoting the interests of poor and mar-
ginalised people threatens to return the right-to-
information idea to its bourgeois-liberal roots,
depriving it of the transformative potential the MKSS
has demonstrated. For instance, despite the GBS's
good work in Goa, the main users of the new right to
information have been urban middle-class people,
using the law not to hold the government to account
for its commitments to social equity, but to protect
their own property rights, pursue business interests,
or campaign to improve the quality of tertiary educa-
tion (Jenkins and Goetz 1999a). There may thus be
additional hidden costs to some variants of state-fos-
tered civil society: the tendency to produce forms of
activism content with what might be termed 'trickle-
down politics' - that is, the hope that the initial over-
representation of middle-class concerns will give way
to agendas relevant to disprivileged groups. To date,
there is very little evidence of this taking place in
' For a more nuanced approach to the relationship
between ascriptive associations and civil society, see
Chapter 8 (Civil Society and the Politics of Identity') of
Wood (1995:238-63).
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India. Moreover, any hope that participatory budget-
ing in Latin America might generate demands for
similar levels of popular involvement in the crucial
downstream function of auditing - the only means
by which commitments to the poor can effectively be
monitored - have failed to materialise.
In short, state-fostered forms of civil society seem to
be poor at demanding and obtaining opportunities
to engage in perhaps the most sensitive area of gov-
ernance: auditing the performance of government
itself, particularly with respect to the expenditure of
resources. Indeed, India's most impressive example
of state-fostered civil society has in its early years
also proven notably disinclined towards popular
auditing. The self-help and neighbourhood groups
established under the People's Planning Campaign
in Kerala have generated a great number of democ-
ratic benefits, but (the work of the KPMS notwith-
standing) organising to strike at the local roots of the
corrupt system has not been one of them. Again, the
state's hand in fostering the emergence of this form
of civil society appears at least partly responsible for
this shortcoming. The NGO contracted by the state
government to 'assist' in forming local associations is
closely connected to the main party in the state's rul-
ing coalition. As with the participatory budgeting
processes in Latin America, the substantive involve-
ment of Kerala's people in development planning has
not yet led to greater demands for inclusion in sys-
tematic public auditing of actual expenditure.
Another way of stating this as a more general propo-
sition is to say that state-fostered civil society organ-
isations do not seem well-suited to operating along
the lines pioneered by MKSS.
But could not the MKSS - the benchmark against
which others are being measured - itself be seen as
state-fostered? If it can be, then the entire concept
of state-sponsored civil society becomes so all-
encompassing as to signify nothing. Indeed, this
question throws into sharp relief a more basic con-
ceptual problem with the theoretical literature: it is
unclear what forms of state action qualify as 'foster-
ing'. A start in the right direction would be to iden-
tify two qualifying categories. The first consists of
civil-society responses organised directly by the
U This theme is elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 7
of Jenkins (1999).
state, with roles corresponding to the functional
requirements of specific government programmes.
The classic cases are public-works projects or com-
plex subsidy bureaucracies, where social forces coa-
lesce around a set of reasonably concrete demands
pertaining to the operation of a programme. The
Porto Alegre case, as a clear example of a process
which produced a particular form of civil society
response, sits fairly comfortably in this category In
the second category are cases which indicate the
influence of the stated institutional structure on the
formation or operation of civil society; these
include such variables as the relations between tiers
of government and the details of the electoral sys-
tem. Again, the Porto Alegre experiment would
qualify to the extent that the autonomy of munici-
pal governments in Brazil shaped the willingness of
the local authorities to incorporate civil society so
closely into the process of participatory budgeting.
As for the MKSS, one could argue that it has been
shaped by the necessity of acting within the frame-
work of India's decentralised political arenas, and
that it should therefore be considered a product of
the institutional structure. But the MKSS - and indeed
its first round of jan sunwais - preceded the
Rajasthan government's establishment of new, con-
stitutionally autonomous local-government struc-
tures. Alternatively, it could be argued that the MKSS
focuses primarily on one set of government pro-
grammes - employment-generation schemes. And
yet, this seems flimsy grounds on which to classify
the MKSS as 'state fostered'. The MKSS is in fact the
alternative to precisely those forms of civil society
that the Rajasthan government has deliberately
sought to foster. In 1996, the state government
sought to demonstrate that a right to information
was unnecessary by instituting its own programme
of social audit. People were encouraged to 'partic-
ipate' in their localities - mostly by handing com-
plaints to 'touring' bureaucrats, but also by setting
up local vigilance committees. And yet even senior
bureaucrats responsible for staging the fairly elabo-
rate logistics admit that the programme was superfi-
cial12 - the supporting documentation required for a
genuine audit was not made available - and more
importantly that it generated virtually no sustainable
Interview, 24 December 1997, Jaipur. 'Social Audit Scheme Comes a Cropper', The Hindu, 20
December 1996.
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civil-society response.° Thus, on neither count can
MKSS be considered a product of state-fostering.
6 Conclusion
This article has highlighted how corruption in key
sectors of civil society - those which should be the
natural allies of the poor - can impede efforts to
build a broader movement for accountability based
on the principal that ordinary citizens are entitled to
scrutinise government expenditure records. It has
also questioned generalisations in the theoretical lit-
erature concerning the capacity of 'state-fostered'
forms of civil society to make the state more
accountable to the poor. The Indian case demon-
strates the potential for state-fostering to produce
precisely the kinds of 'compromised' civil society
organisations which inhibit the emergence of effec-
tive anti-corruption movements based on local-level
popular auditing. State-fostering, it has been argued,
can also produce a range of unintended conse-
quences which can offset this disadvantage. But the
very unpredictability of this process undermines the
notion that states (or development agencies) can
deliberately generate such outcomes. One unin-
tended consequence from the Indian case - ascrip-
tive associations testing the limits of government
transparency - also helps to expose the shortcom-
ings of theories which assume a functional differen-
tiation between the 'modern' and 'ascriptive'
categories within civil society Ironically, in Latin
America - whence most of the evidence for the opti-
mistic view of state-fostered civil society has been
drawn - the kind of focused right-to-information
approach which the MKSS has used so effectively in
Rajasthan is nowhere on the horizon. This raises
suspicions that state-fostering of civil society, what-
ever its merits, comes at a heavy price: the prolifera-
tion of associations unwilling to move from 'safe'
forms of participation (for instance, in the setting of
budget priorities) to those which risk direct con-
frontation with government officials and their pow-
erful accomplices in the elite-oriented sector of civil
society Such groups appear predisposed to shy away
from effectively demanding and obtaining govern-
ment records, let alone organising ordinary people
to analyse such information to determïne where
money allocated for their benefit has actually gone.
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